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This website provides a research guide for the analysis of Fourth Amendment protection from governmental intrusion on personal e-mail and Internet communications.  The scope
of this research guide is limited to protection of the Fourth Amendment provides as to acts of government agencies and law enforcement officials in obtaining e-mail and Internet
communication data, either through real-time interception or retrieval from electronic storage.  This research guide does not provide a detailed history of the evolution or application
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor does it deal with the establishment or violation of rights to privacy from the intrusion by non-governmental
agencies such as employers or other private citizens.
As you will find below, there are no authoritative or landmark cases that pass on the reasonable expectation of privacy a person has in their Internet communication.  Most analysis
of the Fourth Amendment protection in cases and legal articles or publications analogize the nature of an e-mail or web communication to several categories of traditional forms of
communication on which the court has already ruled or for which the statutory provisions specifically allow. This often involves whether the communication was intercepted in real-
time, which the courts regard like a traditional telephone conversation, or extracted from "electronic storage", which is considered more like personal papers and effects. The level
of protection afforded also depends on whether the storage is short term, which the courts have analogized to a safety deposit box, or long term which has been treated like filed
business papers.
The amount of information intercepted from an e-mail or Internet communication also plays a major part in the determination of the Fourth Amendment protection, where the courts
have found an expectation of privacy in the “content” of a communication, but not in the “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling” information that accompanies the
communication. Thus interception of this adjunct routing information does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment at all.
This treatment of the Fourth Amendment application to e-mail and Internet communications does not provide an easy method for determining the level of protection to be afforded
a particular intercepted e-mail or Internet communication by the courts. While this research guide does not assume to suggest the proper answer to this question, it does seek to
expose the reader to the many facets of analysis required to argue the issue from either side.
About the Author
William R. King is a second-year law student at Georgia State University College of Law and Moot Court board member.  William's interests lie in technology related law, including
Intellectual Property, e-Commerce, and Internet privacy issues.
Disclaimer
Bibliographies on this Web site were prepared for educational purposes by law students as part of Nancy P. Johnson's Advanced Legal Research course. The Law Library
does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information provided. Thorough legal research requires a researcher to update materials from date of
publication; please note the semester and year the bibliography was prepared.
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The Fourth Amendment to the constitution clearly establishes the concept that a "reasonable" search requires a warrant supported by probable cause, and this concept has been
vigorously applied by the courts in all but a few exceptional circumstances, e.g. when the immediacy of the search is necessary to protect the life of the officer or others, or when
there is the pending danger that evidence may be destroyed.  Often, the question turns not on the reasonableness of the search, i.e. the validity of the warrant, but on whether the
intrusion constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment at all.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Legislative Acts
The following legislative acts represent Congress' will to provide protection for the privacy of electronic communications.  However, the
protection provided in these statutes often criminalizes the intrusion upon personal e-mail or Internet by private citizens while at the same time
lowering or circumventing the Fourth Amendment protection against the same intrusion by the Government.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control And Safe Streets Act
Of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351;
82 Stat. 197 (1968).
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act Of 1968, or the Wiretap Act, enacted
by Congress under the guidance of the Katz and Berger decisions, established strict limitations
on the Government's ability to intercept oral communications transmitted over wire.  A Wiretap
warrant required a high level of scrutiny by the issuing court (often referred to as super warrant
requirements), detailing the conversations to be intercepted and the persons for whom
conversations were sought.  Wiretaps were to be used as a last resort investigative technique
and were required to be terminated immediately once the specified information was obtained.  
The relevant provisions are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22.
Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, or ECPA, expanded the statutes
promulgated under the Wiretap Act to include non oral and non-wire based electronic
communications.  The ECPA also established protection for electronically stored information,
such as documents stored in computer files codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12.
Further, the Legislature, apparently in response to the Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland,
established in the Act rules and requirements for the installation of pen register devices,
including the requirement of a court order, albeit a lesser requirement than a warrant supported
by probable cause.  These  provisions are referred to as the Pen Register statutes and are
codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27.
Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT
Act, or Patriot Act.  This act amended several statutes promulgated by the Wiretap Act and
ECPA, such as amending the definition of a wire communications in 18 .U.S.C. 2510(1) so that it
would no longer include such communications when in electronic storage, thus allowing the
government to obtain voicemail communications under the less restrictive standards of these
statutes.
The Patriot Act also expanded the definition of pen register and trap and trace devices in 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) to include dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information to make
the devices more readily applicable to modern forms of electronic communication, such as the
Internet.  The Act further modified the Pen Register statutes to ensure that any devices utilized
under the statute would not intercept "content" information and the law enforcement officers
would use all technology reasonably available to prevent the interception of content in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3121.
Statutes
While the operable body of statutory law for the protection of privacy in electronic communications is contained in the entire sequence of
statutes promulgated by the legislative acts above, the following excerpts have been provided that  are specifically applicable to the protection
of personal Internet communications from Governmental intrusion.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2005). "contents", when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication;
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2005). (1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication under this chapter shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to
a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's authority to make such
application. Each application shall include the following information:
  (a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the
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officer authorizing the application;
  (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to
justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense
that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) except as provided in subsection (11), a
particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the
communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications
sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted;
  (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been
tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
  (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. If
the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not
automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a
particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional
communications of the same type will occur thereafter;
  (e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the
individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to
intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, or electronic communications involving
any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by
the judge on each such application; and
  (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results
thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such
results.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)
(2005).
(a) Contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage. A governmental entity
may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications
system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over
the offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant. A governmental entity may require
the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or
electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications
system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b)
of this section.
(b) Contents of wire or electronic communications in a remote computing service.
  (1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the
contents of any wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is made applicable by
paragraph (2) of this subsection--
    (A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental entity obtains a
warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant; or
    (B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if the
governmental entity--
      (i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or
State grand jury or trial subpoena; or
      (ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;
except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title.
  (2) Paragraph (1) is applicable with respect to any wire or electronic communication that is held
or maintained on that service--
    (A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created by means
of computer processing of communications received by means of electronic transmission from),
a subscriber or customer of such remote computing service; and
    (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such
subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such
communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer
processing.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2005). (c) Records concerning electronic communication service or remote computing service.
  (1) A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote
computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) only when the
governmental entity--
    (A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or equivalent State
warrant;
    (B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;
    (C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; or
    (D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning
telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or customer of
such provider, which subscriber or customer is engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined
in section 2325 of this title; or
    (E) seeks information under paragraph (2).
  (2) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose
to a governmental entity the--
    (A) name;
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    (B) address;
    (C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and
durations;
    (D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
    (E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any
temporarily assigned network address; and
    (F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account
number),
of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental entity uses an
administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury
or trial subpoena or any means available under paragraph (1).
  (3) A governmental entity receiving records or information under this subsection is not required
to provide notice to a subscriber or customer.
18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2005). (c) Limitation. A government agency authorized to install and use a pen register or trap and trace
device under this chapter or under State law shall use technology reasonably available to it that
restricts the recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or
electronic communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic
communications.
18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2005). Application for an order for a pen register or a trap and trace device 
(a) Application.
  (1) An attorney for the Government may make application for an order or an extension of an
order under section 3123 of this title authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen
register or a trap and trace device under this chapter, in writing under oath or equivalent
affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction.
  (2) Unless prohibited by State law, a State investigative or law enforcement officer may make
application for an order or an extension of an order under section 3123 of this title authorizing or
approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device under this chapter,
in writing under oath or equivalent affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction of such State.
(b) Contents of application. An application under subsection (a) of this section shall include--
  (1) the identity of the attorney for the Government or the State law enforcement or investigative
officer making the application and the identity of the law enforcement agency conducting the
investigation; and
  (2) a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4)
(2005).
(3) the term "pen register" means a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not
include the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device or
process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing,
or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider or
any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost
accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business;
(4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device or process which captures the incoming
electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the
contents of any communication;
Cases
Expectation of Privacy
Up until  1967 the courts had treated current day electronic communications, i.e. the telephone, like any other personal papers and effects under the line of cases established by
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 12.  Specifically, for a violation of Fourth Amendment protection from the interception of a
telephone conversation to be established, it was necessary for a trespass to have occurred.  By 1967 the Supreme Court recognized the importance that the telephone had
acquired in American's daily lives, and sought to establish new boundaries for the protection of the public's use of this now pervasive form of communication.
Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
This case involved the a phone conversation of the defendant intercepted from a public phone
booth by the planting of an electronic "bug" on the outside of booth by the law enforcement
officer without first obtaining a warrant..  The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects
people not places, and abandoned the requirement of trespass for a government action to be a
search under the Fourth Amendment in favor of the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Katz is also significant in this context because it dealt with the interception of a telephone
conversation.  The Court recognized the difference between an aural conversation and more
tangible papers and effects, and sought to provide the proper level of protection for such
intangible communications under the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment Protection from Government Intrusion of E-mail and Internet Communications - LibGuides at Georgia State University College of Law
file:///I|/...2/LibGuide%20Backups/fourth_amendment_protection_from_government_intrusion_of_e-mail_and_internet_communications_121157_1353173517.html[11/17/2012 1:03:57 PM]
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967).
This case dealt with the constitutionality of a State eavesdrop statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. CODE §
813-a. The Court held that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing an intrusion
into the privacy of the defendant without a warrant supported by probable cause or describing
the particular conversations to be intercepted.
The Court in Berger laid out detailed requirements for a warrant authorizing electronic
surveillance, including the identification of the conversations and the person whose
conversations were sought, and required that electronic surveillance investigations be no longer
than necessary to obtain the sought-after information, after which they must be terminated.  The
Court stressed the need for "adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures" over the
issuance and performance of surveillance warrants.  These restrictions provided guidance to the
"super warrant" requirements that the legislature drafted into the Wiretap Act.
Up to the writing of this research guide, there has been no Federal case law which passes on the reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail or other personal Internet
communication.  A few non-federal jurisdiction cases are noteworthy, however.
United States v. Maxwell, 45
M.J. 406 (1996).
This case involved the violation of the defendant of the U.C.M.J. by the exchange of
pornographic images over the internet and the use of indecent language via email.  A warrant
was obtained to retrieve the obscene graphic files from the service provider (AOL), but did not
specifically include specification that the emails should be obtained.
The Court held that the retrieval of the emails without proper specification in the warrant violated
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and therefore reversed defendant's conviction as to the
obscene languages.
Notable to our context here is the Court's recognition that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mails stored on an ISP's computers, analogizing e-mails to phone
conversations and sealed letters.
Commonwealth v. Proetto,
771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001).
In this case the defendant made sexually explicit remarks to a child via Internet chat and sent a
sexually explicit picture to her via e-mail.  The defendant attempted to suppress the evidence
based on his Fourth Amendment right to privacy in his communications. 
The Court held in this case that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail
and Internet communications because the defendant had no way of knowing who was on the
other end of the communications, and that those communications were not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.  Further, since the e-mails and chat transcripts were recorded on the
receiving in and turned over to the police, the communications were not intercepted
"contemporaneous with the transmission", there was violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Act (similar to the Wiretap Act).
 
Electronic Storage
The Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986 added statutory provisions to the U.S. Code dealing with electronic communications and transactional records residing
in electronic storage.  Specifically, the statute provides the methods by which the government may obtain communications and records from electronic communication service
providers in 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
While targeted at traditional computer files, this statute becomes applicable to e-mail communications through the technical nature of the transmission of an e-mail.  As the e-mail
is routed through the various devices and computers that make up the communication channel, it is often stored and then retransmitted.  Thus an e-mail exists simultaneously as a
live communication deserving of the heightened protection afforded a telephone conversation and as a communication in electronic storage which has traditionally been afforded
much less protection.
While many of the following cases deal with civil matters, they reveal the courts' struggle with this duality.
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
United States Secret Service,
36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the Secret Service seized a computer from a service provider that contained, among
other things, the e-mails of 365 customers.
The Court held that this seizure of the e-mails was a violation of Title II of the ECPA dealing with
stored wire and electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et. seq., but no a violation of the
Wiretap Act and subsequent amendments under 18 U.S.C. 2510 et. seq., because violation of
the Wiretap Act required interception of the e-mail to be "contemporaneous with transmission",
or intercepted real-time.
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.
2001).
This case involved an airline pilot who's website had been illegally accessed by his employer
who obtained e-mails sent by the plaintiff critical of his employer.  Plaintiff pushed for seizure of
the e-mails to be a violation of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et. seq. as opposed to Title II of
the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et. seq. because of the increased civil damages available for
intercepted communications as opposed to those retrieved from electronic storage.
This case is notable in our analysis because the Court recognized the dual nature of an e-mail
communication, stating "an electronic communication in storage is no more or less private than
an electronic communication in transmission. Distinguishing between the two for purposes of
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protection from interception is irrational and an unsupportable result given Congress' emphasis
of individual privacy rights during passage of the ECPA."
However, the Court's decision was subsequently withdrawn, and a new decision issued that
followed Steve Jackson Games requirement that an interception must be contemporaneous with
the e--mail's transmission.
United States v. Councilman,
373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004).
In this case a company who provided book publishing services and communication services to
book sellers implemented a system to intercept the e-mail messages of its customers to gain a
competitive advantage.
The court recognized that e-mails traveling the Internet may "constantly" be in storage and in
transit "simultaneously", but they found that in this case the technical nature of the interception
took place during temporary, intermediate storage of the message and not "while in transmission
through the wires or cables between computers", and that therefore the plaintiffs were foreclosed
from their claims under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et. seq.
 
Information Voluntarily Conveyed to 3rd Parties
In determining whether certain information intercepted from personal Internet communications was deserving of Fourth Amendment protection, the courts may apply previous
holdings that a person has no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a third party .  This factor was instrumental in the Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979), which established the basis for the use of pen register devices by law enforcement without a warrant supported by probable cause.
This doctrine would be most applicable to e-mail communications received by the intended recipients, thus terminating the senders expectation of privacy. United States v. King,
55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995).  Also falling under this doctrine are portions of e-mail or web communications required for the Internet service provider (ISP) to fulfill  the
desired request, i.e. sending the e-mail or retrieving the requested web document, and may include e-mail addresses, web addresses, etc. from the communication.  This doctrine
has also been applied to personally identifiable information provided to an ISP in establishing a service account and subsequently obtained by law enforcement officers in relation
to a specific communication or set of communications.
United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976).
Account records obtain from defendant's banks were used to convict defendant of a variety of
charges of illegal manufacturing of whiskey and tax fraud.  The defendant contended that the
seizure of the bank records violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Court established that the defendant had no legitimate expectations of privacy in his bank
records because the bank was a third party to which he disclosed his affairs when he opened his
accounts at the bank, and that therefore no Fourth Amendment protection existed.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979).
The defendant was convicted of robbery in part based on evidence obtained by the installation of
a pen register device to record the phone numbers dialed from defendant's home.
The Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the digits dialed
into his phone in part because this information was voluntarily conveyed to the phone company
and used by the phone company in the normal course of business, such as establishing
communications, billing, and detecting and preventing obscene or annoying callers.
United States v. Hambrick, 55
F.Supp.2d 504 (4th Cir.
2000).
An undercover officer determined from online conversations with the defendant that the
defendant intended to entice a minor child to leave his home and come and live with defendant. 
The officer seized records from the defendants Internet service provider (ISP) that allowed the
officer to identify defendant.
The Court held, that while the subpoena used to obtain the records was invalid, that the
defendant nevertheless had no expectation in the privacy of the information he conveyed to his
ISP ant therefore was entitled to no protection under the Fourth Amendment.
Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325
(6th Cir. 2001).
Law enforcement agents seized computers from the operator of a BBS which contained, among
other things, the e-mails of the board's subscribers.  The subscribers claimed that the seizure of
their e-mails violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
The Court held that the subscribers lost their legitimate expectation of privacy in any e-mail that
had already reached its recipient; analogizing these facts to a letter-writer, whose "expectation of
privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery" of the letter.
United States v. Butler, 151
F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Me. 2001).
A student was charged with illegally receiving child pornography over University computers in
part on evidence obtained from "session logs" maintained by the University which identified the
defendant as recipient of the computers.  The defendant moved to suppress claiming that
seizure of the session logs violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Court held the defendant had not established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
session logs, since the logs were obviously maintained for the benefit of the University and not
the defendant, and therefore were suppressible on the defendant's motion.
 
Content vs. Routing/Addressing Information
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The statutory language promulgated by the legislature in the acts detailed below define a distinction between the "content" of a communication, for which a warrant supported by
probable cause is required for interception under the Wiretap Act, and dialing, routing, addressing,  and signaling information, which can be intercepted under the Pen Register
statute promulgated by the ECPA by simply showing that some information relevant to an ongoing investigation is likely to be revealed. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).  
The application of this distinction to e-mail and Internet communications becomes problematic, because e-mail addresses and web site URLs, while used to establish
communication like a phone number, also relay much more information about the purpose of the communication and the identity of the parties involved in the communication.
The difference in Fourth Amendment protection afforded these two components of a communication and the related policy was established in the following cases.
United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159
(1977).
The plaintiff phone company challenged  a court order for the installation of pen register devices
on the phones of alleged gambling enterprise, claiming that the devices could only be installed
pursuant to the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et. seq. 
The Court held that the installation of the pen registers was not governed by the Wiretap Act
because they did not intercept the content of the communication as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2510(8), noting that "a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen
register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only
the telephone numbers that have been dialed--a means of establishing communication".
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979).
The defendant was convicted of robbery in part based on evidence obtained by the installation of
a pen register device to record the phone numbers dialed from defendant's home.
The Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the digits dialed
into his phone in part because the digits were simply a means of establishing communication





The following books and treatises on the subject are available and are quoted or cited in the various law review articles and publications referenced in this research guide.
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE
NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E. Agre
& Marc Rotenberg eds.,
1997)
This book contains a series of 10 scholarly essays on technology-based privacy issues.  Each
essay provides addresses the current state of privacy and the direction things are headed.  The
most prevalent theme in the essay is how advances in cybertechnology have led to greater
threats to personal privacy, but have also led to greater promise for privacy protection.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(2004).
This book by Daniel, an associate law professor at George Washington University Law School,
provide insight into the current state of privacy in American, including the constant collection of
personal data gleaned from our Internet surfing into "digital dossiers" which pose a grave threat
to our privacy and recommendations on how the law can be reformed to simultaneously protect
our privacy and allow us to enjoy the benefits of our increasingly digital world.
ROBERT O'HARROW, NO PLACE




Robert O'Harrow, who covers privacy and technology issues for the Washington Post, provides
a detailed look at the growth of the surveillance industry from both the perspective of the
corporations amassing of data marketing purposes to the government's push for surveillance in
a post 9/11 world.
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communications.
Westlaw makes a vast online library of legal research materials available to subscribers at http://www.westlaw.com.
Westlaw key numbers for researching Fourth Amendment protection of personal e-mail and Internet communications:
349 Searches and Seizures
  349I In General
    349k25 Persons, Places and Things Protected
      349k26 k. Expectation of Privacy.
372 Telecommunications
  372X Interception or Disclosure of Electronic Communications; Electronic Surveillance
    372X(A) In General
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      372k1435 Acts Constituting Interception or Disclosure
      372k1439 k. Computer Communications.
372 Telecommunications
  372X Interception or Disclosure of Electronic Communications; Electronic Surveillance
    372X(A) In General
      372k1435 Acts Constituting Interception or Disclosure
        372k1440 k. Persons Concerned; Consent.
372 Telecommunications
  372X Interception or Disclosure of Electronic Communications; Electronic Surveillance
    372X(B) Authorization by Courts or Public Officers
      372k1475 k. Carrier's Cooperation; Pen Registers and Tracing
 
The U.S. Government Printing Office provides free access to Legislative, Executive, and Judicial materials, including the statutes and legislative acts referenced
in this research guide, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov.
 
The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS)  of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice provides a website with articles
and guides for law enforcement officers, parents, teachers, lawyers, victims of crimes, and citizens interested in combating computer and intellectual property crimes
at http://www.cybercrime.gov.
 
The ACLU provides a website dedicated to Privacy and Technology Issues at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/PrivacyMain.cfm.
 
Google provides a powerful and comprehensive web search capability at http://www.google.com.
Search keywords that will provide results relevant to Fourth Amendment protection of personal e-mail and Internet communications: Smith Katz e-mail Internet Fourth
Amendment expectation privacy
American Law Reports
The following American Law Reports annotations provide discussion of the applicable statutes and case law .
Mitchell Waldman, Expectation of Privacy in Internet
Communications, 92 A.L.R.5th 15 (2005).
This annotation collects and discusses cases dealing with the constitutional expectation of privacy in Internet
communications. In the context of this research guide, the annotation deals specifically with electronic
communications in transmission and does not include cases or decisions related to electronic storage.
The summary for the annotation provides the consensus result: "An expectation of privacy has generally not been
found to exist with regard to subscriber information provided by service users to their Internet service providers,
records on individuals' Internet usage, or as to communications made on Internet websites. Nor, with limited
exception, have courts generally found a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist in e-mail or electronic chat-room
communications."
Other Secondary Sources
These publications represent the attempt of other lawyers, academics, and law enforcement officials to distill the applicable law from the various statutes, case law, and doctrines
that have been discussed to this point.
James Adams, Suppressing Evidence Gained by Government
Surveillance of Computers, 19 CRIM. JUST. 1 (Spring 2004 ),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/cjmag/19-
1/surveillance.html.
This article discusses what kinds of digital data gained by
government surveillance can be used in court and how such
information might be suppressed under the context of the
doctrines referenced within this research guide.
Bradley J. Bennett , Smith Meets The Patriot: The Digitization of




This article looks at the effects of § 216 of the Patriot Act,
specifically at how it modified the Pen Register provisions of
the ECPA and how it effectively expands the Smith doctrine
to include routing and addressing information from e-mail
and other forms of Internet communication.  This article also
covers how the ECPA Pen Register statute as amended by
the Patriot Act fits with FBI's Carnivore system for Internet
surveillance.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Div., Searching and Seizing This document is a guide to law enforcement officials
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Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal
Investigations (2002), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm.
detailing legal issues which arise in searching and seizing
computers and related electronic evidence in criminal
investigations.  The document outlines the applicable
statutory rules and restrictions of various types of
surveillance, details proper warrant application requirements,
and provides guidelines for determining whether a particular
type of information constitutes "content" for the application of
the various statutes.
Law Reviews




the Lessons of the Wiretap
Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9 (2004).
This article provides a detailed history of the acts and judicial decisions that make up the current
"chaos" surrounding privacy and Fourth Amendment protection of online communications.
Robert Ditzion, Electronic
Surveillance In The Internet
Age: The Strange Case Of
Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1321 (2004).
This article provides analysis of the distinction of content from dialing, addressing, routing and
signaling information as applied to e-mail and Internet communications data in the context of the
Pen Register statute as amended by the Patriot Act.












Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1557 (2004).
This article discusses the protection of privacy the ECPA as affords to electronic communications
in the various categories discussed above, including additional distinctions specified in the act,
e.g. in transmission, in "electronic storage" at a  "electronic communication service" as opposed




As we have seen, no landmark case nor general consensus exists that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail and Internet communications.
The level of protection to be afforded a particular communication depends on a variety of facts, such as how the communication was intercepted, i.e. in transmission or from
electronic storage, how long the communication was in storage, whether the communication was received at the recipient or voluntarily conveyed to a 3rd party, and the nature of
the information intercepted, i.e. content vs. routing/addressing information.  In any memo, brief, or argument these specific factors  must be established and then the applicable
statutes and case law applied.
However, with the Internet growing in influence and pervasiveness day by day, it is likely that the courts will recognize the need for clarity and, just as they did for the telephone in
Katz, and unambiguously establish whether society is willing to accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in e-mail and Internet communications.
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